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1. INTRODUCTION
A large literature studies bank regulatory policies intended
to control moral hazard problems associated with deposit
insurance and optimal regulatory design. Much of the
analysis has focused on uniform bank capital requirements,
risk-based capital requirements, risk-based or fairly priced
insurance premium rates, narrow banking, and, more
recently, incentive-compatible designs.
All formal analyses employ highly simplified
treatments of an individual bank or banking system. This
study is concerned with the appropriateness of modeling
simplifications used to characterize banks’ investment
opportunity sets and access to equity financing. While the
characteristics of assumed investment opportunities differ
among studies, all are highly simplified relative to the
actual opportunities available to banks. In some studies,
banks are assumed to invest only in 0 net present value
(NPV) market-traded securities while in other studies only
in risky nontraded loans. In models where banks make
risky nontraded loans, loan opportunity set characteristics
are highly specialized. Frequently, a bank is limited to
choosing between a high- and a low-risk asset. In both
these cases and those in which loan opportunity sets are
expanded, a well-defined relationship between risk and
NPV is assumed. Further, in many analyses, banks are
assumed to have unrestricted access to equity capital at the
risk-free rate on a risk-adjusted basis.
In the full version of this paper (Kupiec and
O’Brien [1998]), we show that these modeling specializa-
tions have been important for policy results frequently
cited in the literature. The shorter version presented here
is limited to showing that substantial difficulties in opti-
mal regulatory design arise when greater complexity in
bank investment opportunity sets and financing alterna-
tives is recognized.
For the analysis, banks are assumed to maximize
net shareholder value, which derives from the banks’ ‘‘eco-
nomic value-added’’ and the net value to shareholders of
deposit insurance. Economic value-added comes from posi-
tive net present value loan investments and from providing
liquidity or transaction services associated with deposit
issuance. A bank’s economic value-added is measured net of
dead-weight costs associated with outside equity financing
(equity issuance costs) and the present value of potential
distress costs. The latter costs are incurred when outside
capital is raised by the bank against its franchise value to
cover a current account deficit. In contrast to previous
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models of bank regulation where loan investments are
assumed to satisfy a well-defined investment opportu-
nity locus—such as first-or second-order stochastic domi-
nance—different loan NPV and risk configurations are
permitted here.1 Even if a bank’s optimal loan choices can
be limited to a subset of all its loan investment opportuni-
ties, this set will depend on the regulatory regime. Also, in
determining its risk exposure, the bank has access to risk-
free and risky 0 NPV market-traded securities.
Because deposit insurance can create moral hazard
incentives, share value maximization need not coincide
with maximization of the bank’s economic value-added. In
our model, the objective of regulatory policy is to mini-
mize reductions in banks’ economic value-added due to
moral hazard influences on bank investment and financing
decisions. Besides the determinants of economic value-
added described above (that directly enter shareholder net
values), optimal regulatory design must also factor in the
dead-weight costs incurred in closing an insolvent bank.
If, as assumed in previous models of bank regula-
tion, the bank has unrestricted access to equity capital at
the risk-free rate on a risk-adjusted basis, the moral haz-
ard problem associated with deposit insurance in these
models can be resolved by requiring full collateralization
of insured deposits with the risk-free asset and setting the
insurance premium at zero. Since equity financing is aval-
iable at the risk-free rate on a risk-adjusted basis, the bank
will want to undertake all positive NPV loan investment
opportunities and deposit issuance will be governed by the
profitableness of providing deposit transaction services.
The optimal design of regulatory policy becomes
much more complicated when it is recognized that outside
equity financing can be costly, that is, all-in issuance costs
may significantly exceed the risk-free rate on a risk-
adjusted basis. When equity issuance is costly, regulatory
schemes that require the bank to raise a lot of equity capi-
tal, including narrow banking, can impose significant
dead-weight costs on bank shareholders and discourage
positive NPV investments. Under costly equity issuance,
an optimal bank capital requirement that most efficiently
resolves moral hazard incentives will be tailored to each
bank’s investment (risk and NPV) opportunities and its
access to capital financing. The optimal bank-specific capi-
tal requirements and insurance premium rates, however,
are difficult to achieve because regulators must have infor-
mation on banks’ investment choices or opportunity sets
on the level of a bank insider.
Incentive-compatible regulatory mechanisms have
been proposed as a way of solving the information problems
that regulators face in designing an optimal policy.2 How-
ever, when bank investment opportunities are more complex
than typically assumed, we find substantial limitations on
the incentive-correcting or sorting potential of incentive-
compatible proposals. Our results suggest that incentive
approaches that are able to achieve optimal bank-specific
results, even if possible, require extensive information
gathering. More likely, feasible regulatory alternatives will
be much less information-intensive and, even when usefully
employing incentives, will be uneven in their effectiveness
and decidedly suboptimal on an individual bank basis.
2. BANK SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
 AND ECONOMIC VALUE
2.1. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Each bank makes investment and financing decisions in
the initial period to maximize the net present value of
shareholders’ claims on bank cash flows realized in the next
period. On the asset side, a bank may invest in one-period
risky nontraded loans, risky 0 NPV market-traded securi-
ties, and a 0 NPV risk-free security.
Individual loans are discrete investments and a
bank’s loan investment opportunity set is defined to be the
set of all possible combinations of the discrete lending
opportunities it faces. Each loan has an associated invest-
ment requirement, NPV, and set of risk characteristics.
While financial market equilibrium (absence of arbitrage)
requires that the expected returns on traded assets be linearly
related to their priced risk components, this condition
places no restrictions on the relationship between the NPV
and risk of nontraded assets. Assets with positive NPV are
expected to return to bank shareholders more than theirFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 203
market equilibrium required rates of return. For such
assets, there are no equilibrium conditions that impose a
relationship among NPV, investment size, or risk. Thus, a
bank’s loan investment opportunity set could be character-
ized by a wide variety of investment size, loan portfolio
NPV, and risk combinations. Any subset of investment
portfolios that a bank may choose to restrict itself to will
depend on the regulatory policy regime.
The bank finances its investments in loans  ,
risky securities  , and the risk-free asset   with a
combination of internal equity capital, external equity, and
deposits. End-of-period deposit values   are govern-
ment insured against default. Internal equity   repre-
sents the contribution of the initial shareholders. Outside
equity financing   generates issuance costs of 
per dollar of equity issued. While deposit accounts provide
transactions or liquidity services, the model treats these
accounts as equivalent to one-period discount bonds.
Deposits earn the one-period risk-free return of  , less a
charge for liquidity services that earns the bank a profit of
 per dollar of deposits. Both these profits and the bank’s
deposit insurance premium payments, denoted by  ,
are paid at the beginning of the period. The bank has a
maximum deposit base of   (par value).
In the second period, the bank’s cash flows from its
loans, risky securities, and risk-free bonds are used to pay
off depositors. Shareholders receive any excess cash flows
and obtain rights to a fixed franchise value,  .3 If cash flow
is insufficient to meet depositors’ claims, the bank may
issue equity against its franchise value. However, equity
issued against   to finance end-of-period cash flow short-
falls generates ‘‘distress issuance costs’’ of   per dollar
of equity issuance. As with equity sales in nondistress
periods, distress issuance costs would include both transac-
tion fees and costs for certifying the value of the issue. The
deposit insurer assumes the bank if it cannot cover its
existing deposit liabilities.
2.2. BANK SHAREHOLDER VALUE
Under these assumptions, the net present value of initial
shareholders’ claims is given by
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The components of shareholder value follow: 
is the value of the loan portfolio,   its required initial
investment, and   the loan portfolio’s net present
value;   is the present value of the bank’s end-of-period
franchise value;   are the profits from deposit-generated
fee income;   is the net value of deposit insurance to
bank shareholders.   has a value equivalent to that of a Euro-
pean put option written on the bank’s total asset portfolio
with a strike price of  . This strike
price is the cash flow value below which the bank’s sharehold-
ers default on the bank’s deposit liabilities. For  .
The second line in equation 1 captures the costs asso-
ciated with outside equity issuance.   covers any financing
gap that remains after deposits, inside equity, and deposit
profits net of the insurance premium,  , are
exhausted by the bank’s investments. Each dollar of external
finance generates   in issuance costs, requiring that 
dollars of outside equity be raised.   is the
initial value of the contingent liability generated by end-
of-period distress costs. The distress costs are proportional
to the difference between two simple put options,   and
, where both options are defined on the underlying value
of the bank’s asset portfolio.   is the value of a put option
with a strike price of  , the threshold value
below which the bank must raise outside equity to avoid
default. The strike prices of these options define the range
of cash-flow realizations, ( ), within which share-
holders bear financial distress costs.4 Distress costs reduce
shareholder value since  .5
2.3. SHAREHOLDER VALUE MAXIMIZATION
The shareholder value function,  , must be maximized
using integer programming methods. This is necessitated by
Sj LO Ie
r – J pBe
r – PI fBe
r – – ++ + – =
d1
1 d1 –




Em a x I T M fBe
r – 1 p + () Be
r – W – – ++ + () 0 , {} =
II j
jL Î "å = jL0 jLj0












r 1 d1 – () J – – =
jd 0 PI , £ 0 º
E












r – – =
jd j , ds
PD PI ³
S204 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
the assumption that loans are discrete nontradeable invest-
ments with individualized risk and return characteristics.
Let   represent the risk-adjusted present value
of loan portfolio   that can be formed from the bank’s loan
investment opportunity set. The loan portfolio has a required
investment of   and an NPV equal to  . The




and   indicates that the function K is to be
evaluated conditional on the loan portfolio  . The condi-
tional value of K is maximized over  , and the
risk characteristics of the market-traded securities portfolio
with   satisfying the financing constraint in equation 2,
 and  . Thus, for each possible
loan portfolio (including the 0 investment loan portfolio),
the bank maximizes the portfolio’s associated K value by
making the appropriate investment choices for risk-free
and risky securities, outside equity issuance, and inside
capital (or dividend payout policy). The bank then chooses
the loan portfolio for which the sum of loan portfolio NPV
and associated maximum K value is the greatest.
2.4. BANK ECONOMIC VALUE-ADDED
For analyzing the efficiency of alternative regulatory envi-
ronments, we define a measure of the bank’s economic
value-added. As a simplification, the bank is assumed to
capture entirely the economic value-added from its invest-
ment and deposit activities. That is, the bank’s profits from
deposit taking mirror the depositor welfare gains generated
by transaction accounts, and the bank’s asset portfolio NPV
reflects the entire NPV produced by its investment activities.
This avoids modeling the production functions, utility
functions, and bargaining positions of the bank’s counter-
parties when constructing a measure of social welfare. The
bank’s franchise value,  , is assumed to reflect entirely eco-
nomic value-added (the future NPV of lending opportuni-
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 Netted against these economic value-added com-
ponents are the bank’s dead-weight equity issuance costs
and distress costs, and the dead-weight costs borne by the
insurer if the bank is closed. Under insolvency, the insurer
pays off depositors with the realized cash flow from the
bank’s investments, the sale of the bank’s franchise, and a
drawdown on its cash reserve from accumulated premium
payments. Dead-weight closure costs arise if, in disposing
of the bank’s franchise, the insurer loses a fraction of the
initial value  . While the magnitude of such losses is
unclear in practice, the simplest approach is to assume this
fraction is the same as that lost by shareholders in a distress
situation, .7 Under this assumption, the insurer’s dead-
weight closure costs are  . Aggregating across all of the
bank’s claimants the realized end-of-period payments (pay-
outs), taking their risk-adjusted present expected values,
and subtracting initial investment outlays yield the bank’s
economic value-added. Where closure costs are equal to
, the bank’s economic value-added (EVA) is,
(3) ).
Because of the influence of deposit insurance on
bank investment and financing choices, bank policies
that maximize the net value of shareholder equity may
not maximize the banks’ EVAs. In the present analysis, an
optimal regulatory policy consists of an insurance pricing
rule and supplemental regulations, that is, capital
requirements, that minimize the distortive incentive
effects of deposit insurance, taking into account the direct
effects on EVAs of the regulatory policy as well. The
insurer or regulator is constrained to providing deposit
insurance to an ongoing bank without subsidy, which is
always possible in our model (see below).
3. OPTIMAL REGULATORY POLICY WHEN
 EQUITY ISSUANCE IS COSTLESS
First, consider the possibility of fairly priced insurance
when the bank has perfect access to equity capital financ-
ing, that is, there are no equity issuance costs ( ).
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premium is equal to the value of deposit insurance to bank
shareholders, that is,  .8 Under a fair-pricing
condition, no equity issuance costs, and access to a risk-free
0 NPV investment, net shareholder value is maximized by
choosing all positive NPV loans and accepting all insured
deposits. Any funding requirements in excess of the bank’s
internal equity capital and deposits can be costlessly met
with outside equity financing. If there are potential distress
costs ( ), these can be costlessly eliminated by invest-
ing in the risk-free asset, as well as investing in positive
NPV loans.
Further, when an intermediary can guarantee its
deposit obligations by collateralizing them with risk-free
bonds, if outside equity issuance is costless, the potential
for costless collateralization creates the possibility of
implementing fairly priced deposit insurance without any
governmental subsidy to the banking system. This possi-
bility is formalized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If (i) initial equity issuance is costless
()   and (ii) the bank has unrestricted access to risk-free
bond investments, then a bank is indifferent between: (a) fairly
priced deposit insurance and (b) a requirement that all insured
deposits be collateralized with risk-free bond investments with an
insurance premium equal to 0.
Proposition 1 establishes the possibility of an
efficient, fairly priced deposit insurance system in the form
of a ‘‘narrow bank’’ deposit collateralization requirement.
This proposition does not depend on banks earning deposit
rents and would hold in a competitive equilibrium. Propo-
sition 1 does require, however, that banks can issue equity
at competitive risk-adjusted rates with no costs or dis-
counts generated, for example, by informational problems
or tax laws.
4. REGULATORY POLICY WHEN EQUITY
 ISSUANCE IS COSTLY
When it is costly to issue outside equity (the likely situa-
tion), a narrow banking requirement can generate signifi-
cant social costs in the form of equity issuance costs and
the opportunity cost of positive NPV investments that go
fBe
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unfunded. However, absent a narrow bank policy, pricing
the deposit insurance guarantee is fraught with difficulties.
One difficultly is that the bank regulators are unlikely to
have sufficient expertise to value the bank’s (nontraded)
assets or assess their risk.9 Even if regulators have suffi-
cient expertise, the bank has an incentive to disguise high-
risk investments or substitute into high-risk assets after its
insurance premium has been set. Without resorting to
highly intrusive monitoring, the moral hazard problem
necessitates capital or other regulations that reduce risk-
taking incentives arising from the deposit guarantee. The
analysis here assumes that the insurer has the expertise to
value individual assets banks might acquire and examines
capital-based regulatory policies intended to solve the
moral hazard problem.
 To facilitate the analysis, we consider a hypotheti-
cal banking system comprised of four independent banks.
Each bank faces a unique loan investment opportunity set
Table 1













Loan Opportunity Set A
1 75 .20 .08 .20 .22 5.44
2 50 .10 .00 .45 .45 2.56
3 100 .25 .10 .30 .32 10.52
Loan Opportunity Set B
1 75 .30 .10 .50 .51 12.14
2 140 .12 .05 .20 .21 2.83
3 50 .20 .10 .60 .61 2.56
Loan Opportunity Set C
1 75 .20 .10 .45 .46 3.85
2 100 .03 -.10 .35 .36 8.33
3 50 .21 .12 .45 .47 2.04
Loan Opportunity Set D
1 190 .21 .05 .10 .11 21.30
2 190 .75 .70 .90 1.14 0.00
3 50 .21 .12 .45 .47 2.04
Risky Market-Traded Security
.35 .30 .30 .42 .00
a One-period expected return to loan i defined by  .5 . See endnote 10.
b One-period systematic risk (standard deviation) for loan  .
c One-period nonsystematic (idiosyncratic) risk for loan  .
d Total risk for loan i (one-period return standard deviation),  .
e NPV is calculated using the expression in endnote 10, where the market price of 
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consisting of three possible loans (seven possible loan com-
binations). For simplicity, individual loans have log-normal
end-of-period payoffs that include a single systematic
(priced) risk source and an idiosyncratic risk.10 Banks’
individual loan opportunity sets are described in Table 1.
Bank A’s opportunity set includes loans with relatively
modest overall risk. Bank B can invest in two loans with
relatively high risk, one of which has substantial NPV.
Bank C’s opportunities also include relatively high-risk
loans; its most profitable loan has negative systematic risk.
Bank D’s investment opportunity set includes a large, low-
risk, high-NPV loan and a large, high-risk, 0 NPV loan.
All four banks can invest in a risk-free bond and a risky 0
NPV security whose characteristics are described in the last
row of Table 1. For simplicity, all heterogeneity across
banks is assumed to arise from differences in loan invest-
ment opportunities. The three banks are subject to identi-
cal equity issuance costs ( .2), distress costs ( .4),
franchise values ( ), maximum internal equity
capital ( ), maximum deposits ( ), and a
common transaction service profit rate ( ). The
risk-free rate is arbitrarily set at .05.
4.1. THE FIRST-BEST SOLUTION
To establish an optimal benchmark, assume that the insurer
has sufficient knowledge to set a fair insurance premium and
that the bank must irrevocably commit to its asset portfolio
and capital structure before the insurer sets its premium.
Table 2 reports each bank’s optimization results.11 Columns
2-6 report optimal loan, securities, and equity financing
choices. Net share value is defined in equation 1 above. Eco-
d0 = d1 =
J 40 =
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nomic value-added is the bank’s net social value and is
defined assuming that insurer closure costs mirror bank dis-
tress costs (equation 3). Net insurance value,  , is
zero by construction. For the risk capital ratio, capital is
defined as the book value of loans and securities minus
deposits, and risk assets are defined as the book value of loans
plus risky securities. Under the closure cost assumption, if
deposit insurance is fairly priced,  , and maximiz-
ing net share value also maximizes economic value-added.
By this measure, fairly priced deposit insurance is a first-best
policy with no need for capital requirements.
Implementing a fairly priced deposit insurance
system is problematic when a bank’s decisions cannot be
completely and continuously monitored. Although each
bank’s insurance premium may be calibrated to fair value
by assuming a bank operating policy that achieves maxi-
mum economic value-added, given this premium and an
ability to alter its asset mix, a bank may face incentives to
substitute into a more risky asset portfolio. In the example
in Table 2, banks B and D could increase their insurance
values, and net shareholder values, if they could substitute
into higher risk assets at the given insurance rates (reported
in footnote a). The insurance would become underpriced
and, while shareholder values would increase, economic
value-added would be reduced.
4.2. OPTIMAL POLICY WITH 
IMPERFECT MONITORING
Absent complete information on each bank’s investments,
deposit insurance can still be fairly priced and moral hazard
incentives removed by imposing a narrow banking require-
PI fBe
r – –
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Table 2
FAIRLY PRICED INSURANCE WITH PERFECT MONITORING
Bank Optimizing Results









A 1, 2, 3 0.00 0.00 27.00 3.47 59.33 59.33 0.00 .154
B 1, 2 0.00 5.26 27.00 0.00 55.35 55.35 0.00 .140
C 1, 2, 3 0.00 0.00 27.00 4.57 53.58 53.58 0.00 .154
D 1 0.00 32.00 27.00 0.00 64.08 64.08 0.00 .167
 232.34
a . For banks A, B, C, and D, the fair premium rates are .002, .008, .009, and 0, respectively.
b Book capital to risk assets. Book capital equals investments in loans and securities minus deposits. Risk assets equal loans plus risky securities.
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ment that all deposits be collateralized with the risk-free
asset. While feasible, the narrow banking solution can
entail large reductions in banks’ EVAs due to equity issu-
ance costs and foregone positive NPV loan opportunities
for which financing costs are now too high (see Kupiec and
O’Brien [1998] for numerical illustration). However, if the
regulator has complete information about each bank’s
investment opportunities and can enforce a minimum cap-
ital requirement, moral hazard incentives can be elimi-
nated and fair insurance premiums can be set at a smaller
social cost than is incurred under narrow banking. In deter-
mining optimal minimum capital requirements, the regu-
lator must determine the minimum capital requirement
and insurance premium rate combination that maximizes
each bank’s economic value-added, subject to a fair-pricing
condition and incentive-compatible condition that the
bank have no incentive to engage in asset substitution at
its required capital and insurance premium settings.12 The
optimal capital requirement will vary with each bank’s
investment opportunity set.
The optimal bank-specific capital requirements
are calculated for each bank in Table 3. The second and
third columns in the table present bank-specific minimum
capital requirements and fair-premium rates for the four
banks. The fourth column shows the maximum economic
value-added for each bank and, for comparison, the fifth
column shows the first-best economic value-added
reported in Table 2. The minimum capital requirements
remove the moral hazard incentives for banks B and D that
would exist at first-best capital requirements and premium
rates. The costs of imposing the capital requirements are
a small reduction in bank B’s EVA due to a reduced loan
portfolio NPV and equity issuance costs incurred by
bank D. In general, the incentive-compatibility constraints
required when the regulator cannot perfectly monitor bank
actions will result in an optimal policy that is not a first-
best solution.
 Notice that the optimal bank-specific capital
requirements are not ‘‘risk-based’’ capital requirements as
defined under current bank capital regulations but are
designed to solve the moral hazard problems. The insur-
ance premium rates, being fair premiums, are risk-based.
This is a more efficient solution than “risk-based” capital
requirements with a fixed deposit insurance rate. Also note
that the costs associated with a minimum risk-asset capital
standard do not include a loss in the value of ‘‘liquidity ser-
vices.’’ Because the capital requirement applies to risk
assets defined to exclude an identifiable risk-free asset
(such as Treasury bills), there is no incentive for banks to
reduce deposit levels. This result contrasts with studies
that suggest an important cost of more stringent capital
requirements is a reduction in the provision of socially
valuable liquidity services (for example, John, John, and
Senbet [1991]; Campbell, Chan, and Marino [1992]; and
Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington [1993]).
4.3. IMPERFECT MONITORING AND 
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
The design of an optimal bank-specific capital policy
imposes the unrealistic requirement that the regulator
know each bank’s investment opportunity set. A growing
literature has proposed the use of incentive-compatible
Table 3
OPTIMAL BANK-SPECIFIC CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND FAIR INSURANCE RATES WITHOUT PERFECT MONITORING
Bank Required Risk-Capital Ratio Premium Rate Economic Value-Added First-Best Economic Value-Addeda Net Insurance Value
Ab ³ .154 .002 59.33 59.33 0.00
B ³ .247 .005 55.30 55.35 0.00
C c ³ .154 .009 53.58 53.58 0.00
D ³ .351 .000 55.36 64.08 0.00
223.57  232.34
a Figures taken from Table 2.
b Bank A’s optimal strategy for any minimum required risk-capital ratio between 0 and .154.
c Bank C’s optimal strategy for any minimum required risk-capital ratio between .045 and .154.208 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
contracting mechanisms that can simultaneously identify
the investment opportunity sets specific to individual
banks and control moral hazard behavior even when the
regulator is not fully informed a priori. Among others,
Kim and Santomero (1988a); John, John, and Senbet
(1991); Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992); Campbell,
Chan, and Marino (1992); Giammarino, Lewis, and Sap-
pington (1993); and John, Saunders, and Senbet (1995)
provide formal analyses of incentive-compatible policies.
In the spirit of this approach, assume as before that
there are four banks each with a loan investment opportu-
nity set that is one of the types presented in Table 1, either
A, B, C, or D. While an individual bank knows its type,
the regulator only knows the characteristics of the alterna-
tive investment opportunity sets but does not know the
opportunity set associated with each individual bank.
Because it cannot distinguish bank types, the regulator
cannot directly set the bank-specific capital requirements
and insurance premiums that achieve the results in Table 3,
that is, that solve the policy problem when the regulator
has complete information on investment opportunity sets.
The incentive-compatible literature suggests, however,
that the risk types can be identified by an appropriate set
of contracts.
Consider, as in Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor
(1992), an ex ante incentive-compatible policy based on a
menu of contracts whose terms consist of combinations of
a required minimum capital ratio and insurance premium
rate, assuming the regulator can enforce a minimum cap-
ital requirement. As in the preceding case, the optimal
capital and insurance premium combinations will satisfy
the constraint that each individual bank will not ‘‘asset-
substitute’’ given its minimum capital requirement and
insurance premium. In addition, the menu offered to
banks must be such that each bank not prefer a capital
requirement–insurance premium rate combination intended
for another bank type.
In general, the capital requirement–premium rate
combinations that satisfy these incentive-compatibility
constraints will differ from those that solve the policy
problem where there is imperfect monitoring but complete
information. For example, if banks were offered a menu of
contract terms taken from columns 1 and 2 of  Table 3—
the capital requirements and premium rate combinations
that maximize firm values under the full information
assumption—bank optimizing choices would not identify
their types. Given such a menu, all banks would claim to
have a type A investment opportunity set.
If bank A is excluded from the table, the fair-
pricing contract terms for the remaining banks in Table 3
show a monotonic inverse relationship between the con-
tract’s capital requirement and its insurance premium. The
inverse relationship is consistent with the ordering of
terms proposed by Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992)
as an incentive-compatible policy when the regulator is not
completely informed of banks’ specific investment oppor-
tunity sets. This inverse relationship will not, however,
produce a correct sorting of banks in the table as type B
and D banks would reveal themselves to be type C banks.
They would choose higher risk investments and produce
lower EVAs than the full information results presented in
Table 3, and their insurance would be underpriced.
Table 4
OPTIMAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND FAIR INSURANCE RATES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Bank Required Bank-Capital Ratioa Premium Rate Economic Value-Added First-Best Economic Value-Addedb Net Insurance Value
A ³ .351 0 52.17 59.33 0.00
B ³ .351 0 54.16 55.35 0.00
C ³ .351 0 49.59 53.58 0.00
D ³ .351 0 55.36 64.08 0.00
211.28  232.34
a Banks A, C, and D will optimally operate at the minimum required capital ratio. Bank B will optimally choose to operate at a capital ratio of .423.
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The optimal solution to the incentive-compatible
contracting problem is given in Table 4. The optimal
incentive-compatible contract imposes a uniform mini-
mum risk-asset capital requirement and a uniform insur-
ance premium on all banks. Bank EVAs also are mostly
smaller than those presented in Table 3. This occurs
because greater limits on regulators’ information impose
additional incentive-compatibility conditions on the regu-
lator that constrain further the set of feasible policies from
which to choose. Given the bank investment opportunities
(and equity issuance costs) in this example, the incentive-
compatible policy even fails to distinguish banks. How-
ever, because it allows for some deposit-financed lending,
the optimal policy is still more efficient than the narrow
banking solution.
Contracts like those in Chan, Greenbaum, and
Thakor (1992) fail to generate a separating equilibrium in this
example because our investment opportunity set and financ-
ing structures are more complex than those that underlie
their model. By assumption, all bank loan investment
opportunity sets in Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor can be
ranked according to first-order or second-order stochastic
dominance.13 In our model, the set of possible asset portfo-
lios represents investment opportunities whose combina-
tions of risk, NPV, and financing requirements do not fit any
well-defined risk ordering. In particular, the opportunity
sets cannot be uniquely ordered by a one-dimensional risk
measure such as first- or second-order stochastic dominance.
This last example illustrates that, with less styl-
ized investment opportunity sets, designing incentive-
compatible policies that achieve a high degree of sorting
among bank types can impose formidable information
requirements on regulators. In some respects, the infor-
mation assumptions made here are still very strong in
that regulators are unlikely to have a clear idea of the con-
stellation of investment opportunities available to banks.
In the present model, if regulators had to consider a wider
set of investment opportunities for each bank than the
four assumed, an optimal policy would produce an eco-
nomic value-added for each bank somewhere between
that shown in Table 4 and the results under a narrow
banking approach.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis has shown the difficulties inherent
in designing an optimal bank regulatory policy where
commonly used modeling stylizations on banks’ invest-
ment and financing choices are relaxed. When banks can
issue equity at the risk-adjusted risk-free rate, a common
modeling stylization, collateralization of deposits with a
risk-free asset costlessly resolves moral hazard inefficiencies
and insurance pricing issues addressed in the literature.
With costly equity issuance, this narrow banking approach
can impose large dead-weight financing costs and reduce
positive NPV investments funded by the banking system.
When equity issuance is costly, the most effective and effi-
cient capital requirements are bank-specific, as they
depend on individual banks’ investment opportunities and
financing alternatives. Directly implementing optimal
bank-specific capital requirements, however, requires
detailed regulatory information on the investment oppor-
tunities and financing alternatives of individual banks.
Incentive-compatible designs have been proposed
in the theoretical literature as a way of minimizing regula-
tory intrusiveness and information requirements in obtain-
ing optimal bank-specific results. However, in relaxing
previous modeling stylizations, we found that heavy infor-
mation requirements also inhibited incentive-compatible
designs in obtaining optimal bank-specific results. Despite
the potential benefits of incentive approaches over rigid reg-
ulations, feasible approaches are still likely to be substan-
tially constrained by limited regulatory information and by
“level playing field” considerations and thus are likely to be
decidedly suboptimal at the individual bank level.210 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 NOTES
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1. For example, see Gennotte and Pyle (1991); Chan, Greenbaum, and
Thakor (1992); and Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993) for use
of stochastic dominance assumptions.
2. For example, see Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992);
Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993); Kim and Santomaro
(1988); John, John, and Senbet (1991); Campbell, Chan, and Marino
(1992); and John, Saunders, and Senbet (1995).
3. Franchise value may arise from continuing access to positive NPV
loan opportunities, the ability to offer transaction accounts at a profit,
and the net value of deposit insurance in future periods.
4.  is a hypothetical value of the distress costs the bank would
face if it could not default on its deposit obligations. Because bank
shareholders will not have to bear distress costs for portfolio value realiza-
tions less than  , the default threshold, the term  , credits
shareholders with the default portion of the distress costs.
5. See Kupiec and O’Brien (1998) for a more complete development of
the option components of the bank’s net shareholder value.
6. This assumption is consistent with the regulatory policies analyzed
below.
7. See James (1991) for a description and estimates of bank closure
costs.
8. The fairly priced premium will equal the insurer’s liability value if
the insurer’s costs in liquidating the bank are the same as the distress








9. Flannery (1991) emphasizes this point and considers the
consequences for insurance pricing and bank capital policy, although his
analysis does not incorporate moral hazard behavior.
10. In terms of earlier notation (see equation 1), the second period cash 
flow from loan   is  , where   is the bank’s
initial required outlay for loan  ,   the expected return,   the
systematic risk component,   the idiosyncratic component,  and
the   terms are independent standard normal variates. The initial value of 
loan    is  , where   is the market price
of risk and   the one-period risk-free rate. For positive NPV loans,
.
11. The shareholder equity maximization problem is solved numerically
using integer programming as described in equation 2 above. As the sum
of lognormal variables is not lognormal and does not have a closed form
density function, all option values are calculated using numerical
techniques. A lognormal distribution approximation to the sum of log-
normal variables is used (see Levy [1992] for details). Option values from
the use of the lognormal approximating distribution were similar to
values calculated using Duan and Simonato’s (1995) empirical
martingale simulation technique.
12. See Kupiec and O’Brien (1998) for the formal incentive-
compatibility conditions.
13. This ordering is also assumed in Giammarino, Lewis, and
Sappington (1992); John, John, and Senbet (1991); and John, Saunders,
and Senbet (1995).
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